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Comment  Roberto Perotti
This is an interesting and well-  written chapter that presents a useful over-
view of ﬁ  scal policy issues and some interesting results. In these comments 
I will focus on what I regard as the two most important empirical questions 
studied in the chapter: (a) is ﬁ  scal policy more or less countercyclical in 
Europe than in the United States? and (b) has the euro plus the Growth and 
Stability Pact induced a more procyclical (less countercyclical) behavior of 
ﬁ  scal policy in European Monetary Union (EMU) countries?
On the ﬁ  rst issue, the answer of the chapter is clear, and conﬁ  rms both 
existing empirical results and common wisdom on the diﬀerence between 
Europe and the United States: “discretionary” ﬁ  scal policy seems more 
countercyclical in the United States, “automatic stabilizers” more counter-
cyclical in Europe. The authors present convincing empirical evidence on 
this eﬀect, and support it with equally convincing robustness analysis. I do 
not have much to add on this point.
On the second issue, obviously it is hard to base any conclusion on less 
than ten years of data, but even leaving this problem aside, I think the ver-
dict is still open, and hard to reach. As the authors point out in section 8.4, 
following the discussion at the conference, the problem is well illustrated by 
a comparison of ﬁ  gures 8.3 and 8.6: while discretionary ﬁ  scal policy in the 
euro area seems procyclical if evaluated against the output gap, it appears 
countercyclical if evaluated against the growth rate of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP).
Note that this issue in turn involves two fundamentally diﬀerent under-
lying issues. The ﬁ  rst is, what is the appropriate variable to cyclically adjust 
the budget? Suppose that a certain expenditure item changes automati-
cally, by law, in response to the output gap; then the appropriate variable 
to   cyclically adjust this expenditure item is the output gap. Similarly, the 
appropriate variable is output growth if by law an expenditure or revenue 
item moves with the change in the level of output. In reality, things are even 
more complex, because the reference level for cyclical adjustment (potential 
output or last year’s output) is not deﬁ  ned by law.
But even assuming we have taken a stance on the appropriate reference 
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level of output in doing the cyclical adjustment, this is diﬀerent from the 
question: “to what variable do policymakers react when setting discretionary 
ﬁ  scal policy?” Here I would surmise that the reasons for using the output 
gap in monetary policy reaction functions are more compelling than in ﬁ  s-
cal policy reactions functions. Monetary authorities understand and use 
the concept of output gap; ﬁ  scal policymakers (therefore including congress-
men when voting on the budget) typically do not know, do not understand, 
and do not use the concept of output gap; they react to GDP growth.
A second explanation for the results on the cyclical behavior of discretion-
ary ﬁ  scal policy (and at the same time an illustration of the perils of drawing 
inference from 8 data points) is ideology and fatigue. Comparing ﬁ  gures 
8.3 and 8.4, it is clear that the results are heavily inﬂ  uenced by two years. 
The euro area result in ﬁ  gure 8.3 depends heavily on 2000 and 2001, two 
good years in terms of gap, when, however, many governments relaxed their 
discretionary ﬁ  scal policy following several years of budget cuts enacted 
to qualify for the EMU. Conversely, the U.S. results are heavily inﬂ  uenced 
by 2001 and 2002, two years of low output gap in the United States, when 
taxes were cut and spending increased, due in part to the ideology of the new 
administration and in part to exogenous foreign policy events.